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The New Accountability
Abstract
As part of standards-based reform, states and districts are designing new approaches to holding schools and
districts accountable for discharging their missions. Virtually every state and thousands of districts are
working on developing standards for student learning and aligning student assessments to those expectations.
Most are taking the next step which is to use achievement of the standards as a basis for accountability.
The new accountability approaches emerging from this work differ from more traditional systems with respect
to one or more of seven factors. District/school approval is being linked to student performance rather than
compliance to regulations; accountability is focusing more on schools as the unit of improvement; continuous
improvement strategies involving school-level planning around specific performance targets are being
adopted; new approaches to classroom inspection are being developed; more categories or levels of
accreditation are being developed; school-level test scores are being publicly reported; and more
consequences are being attached to performance levels. This policy brief reviews these developments and
discusses issues arising from their design and implementation. It draws on several CPRE studies of
accountability, most of which are still in progress. Therefore a number of the findings we cite, particularly
about the effects of emerging accountability systems, are tentative. However, since policymakers are actively
designing and modifying accountability policies, we believe that conveying currently available information
about how they seem to be working, even if that information is preliminary, is worthwhile.
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The New Accountability
by Susan H. Fuhrman
As part of standards-based reform, states and districts are
designing new approaches to holding schools and districts
accountable for discharging their missions.  Virtually every
state and thousands of districts are working on developing
standards for student learning and aligning student assess-
ments to those expectations.  Most are taking the next step
which is to use achievement of the standards as a basis for
accountability.
The new accountability approaches emerging from this work
differ from more traditional systems with respect to one or
more of seven factors1. District/school approval is being linked
to student performance rather than compliance to regula-
tions; accountability is focusing more on schools as the unit
of improvement; continuous improvement strategies involv-
ing school-level planning around specific performance tar-
gets are being adopted; new approaches to classroom in-
spection are being developed; more categories or levels of
accreditation are being developed; school-level test scores
are being publicly reported; and more consequences are be-
ing attached to performance levels.  This policy brief reviews
these developments and discusses issues arising from their
design and implementation.  It draws on several CPRE stud-
ies of accountability, most of which are still in progress.  There-
fore a number of the findings we cite, particularly about the
effects of emerging accountability systems, are tentative.
However, since policymakers are actively designing and modi-
fying accountability policies, we believe that conveying cur-
rently available information about how they seem to be working,
even if that information is preliminary, is worthwhile.
Characteristics of New
Accountability Systems
A Focus on Performance.  States are trying to put more
emphasis on student performance and less on compliance
with regulations in their accreditation or certification of dis-
tricts and schools.  Traditionally, states have monitored com-
pliance to input and process standards through self-reports
and periodic visits. For example, state agencies have moni-
tored pupil/teacher ratios through local forms specifying per-
sonnel assignments and student enrollments, and crosswalked
them with state certification data to monitor assignment of
teachers by field.  Minimal curricular requirements have been
monitored through on-site inspection of syllabi and other pa-
per work, such as school board minutes, indicating adoption
of specific curricula.
More recently, the focus on student performance has led to
the monitoring of outcome data such as test scores and gradu-
ation rates.  Outcome measures (either the level of perfor-
mance or growth in performance) are now being used as
criteria for accreditation.  Not only are policymakers inter-
ested in progress in the three R’s, but they are also including
measures of performance in all core subjects in accountabil-
ity systems.
At the same time, policymakers in many states say they are
trying to reduce regulations and compliance monitoring. The
idea is to free schools from the old compliance mentality and
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to provide more flexibility so they can maximize student per-
formance using new standards.
Schools as the Unit of Improvement.  Whereas traditional
accountability systems held districts responsible and focused
on district-level activities such as employing teachers appro-
priately and developing policies to implement state directives,
new systems focus on schools.  Now measures of success
are collected and reported school by school.  Districts might
also be held responsible for aggregate performance, as in
Kentucky, but the important point is that data are now ana-
lyzed and reported by school.  In the new systems, the state
might act—impose a consequence—on these school data,
regardless of how good the district-level data look or how the
district defines its own responsibilities vis a vis school per-
formance.
Continuous Improvement Strategies.  Most of the new
accountability approaches rest on state-determined perfor-
mance standards or benchmarks of adequate progress.  How-
ever, one new approach involves school-site determination
of and planning around specific performance targets, such as
improved test scores in reading and math.  Progress toward
meeting locally set targets is the primary measure on which
accreditation or state approval hinges.  In Kansas, schools
develop improvement plans with the assistance of a visiting
team of peers within the first 18 months of a 5-year cycle.
At the end of the cycle, the same (external) visiting team of
3-4 peers returns to see whether the goals stated in the
school’s plan have been achieved.
Inspections.  Some states are trying to focus their school
and district visits on teaching and learning.  Instead of paper
reviews and central office visits, the new forms of inspection
consist of lengthy peer visits that include classroom observa-
tion and involve feedback and extensive discussions about
practice.  In addition to Kansas, just referred to above, Rhode
Island is among the states using in-depth reviews.  These
new inspection approaches are sometimes likened to private
agency accreditation, but the aims of the newer state ap-
proaches are more ambitious with respect to providing for
reflection on practice and attention to student work.
More Accountability Categories.  Categories of perfor-
mance are being expanded to discriminate more discretely
among districts and schools.  Districts and schools no longer
simply pass or fail.  Rather, they earn ratings that vary along
a continuum.  For example, Mississippi has five levels.  Those
scoring high (levels 4 and 5) are judged to have high-quality
programs offering the best opportunity to students.  They are
allowed some freedom from regulatory policies like teacher
certification, time and scheduling, and designing things like
K-4 groupings.  At the other end are level 1 districts, which
are placed on probation.
Public Reporting.  More states are publicly reporting dis-
trict and/or school test scores along with other outcome mea-
sures such as attendance and dropout rates. According to
the Council of Chief State School Officers (CCSSO), 47 states
publicly report scores;  39 of them report school-level data.
(CCSSO, 1998)
Consequences Attached to Performance Levels.  Increas-
ingly, consequences are being attached to various accredita-
tion levels and/or levels of performance.  In addition to public
reporting, which draws citizens into the process of evaluating
progress and generates its own consequences for schools,
some states also provide monetary rewards or other forms
of tangible recognition, such as flags or pennants for schools
meeting or exceeding performance targets.  Currently 14
states provide rewards, mostly monetary in nature (ECS,
1997).
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Sanctions now being proposed for poor performance reach
beyond the punishments that states have previously employed
for non-compliance.  The ultimate punishment for non-com-
pliance in the past has been loss of state aid, a step rarely
taken.  In the 1980s, six states developed programs for state
intervention in severely troubled school districts, sometimes
referred to as “academically bankrupt” districts (OERI, 1988).
Additional states have adopted such approaches in the 1990s;
now 31 have sanction provisions in effect.  Generally, a se-
ries of interventions such as visits by technical assistance
teams and the appointment of on-site monitors or conserva-
tors precede the ultimate sanctions: state takeover, removal
of local governance, or school closure or reconstitution with
new faculty and perhaps reassigned students as well.  For
example, low performers in Oklahoma must develop improve-
ment plans and can ultimately face reassignment of faculty
and financial penalty.  In Maryland, sanctions can include
reconstituting schools and bringing in new staff.
Issues in Designing and
Implementing New Accountability
Systems
Despite widespread interest in these new approaches to ac-
countability, they are having a hard time getting off the ground.
It appears that states and districts are encountering problems
putting the new performance-based systems into effect.  Stud-
ies of accountability systems in 10 states reveal a number of
difficult issues that face policymakers and educators (Elmore,
Abelmann and Fuhrman, 1996; Massell, 1998).  Some of these
concerns are technical2, some have to do with the capacity
needed to implement new designs, and some are political.
How is Performance Measured? Measuring student per-
formance involves choosing a set of indicators and instru-
ments.   Most policymakers are mindful of the desirability
of using multiple measures and not just relying on student
test scores (e.g., see Oakes, 1986).  So, in addition to stu-
dent achievement, they include indicators like graduation
rates, post-secondary behavior, and attendance.
Each of these indicators involves making decisions about
the most appropriate data, but the most difficult and con-
tentious choices have concerned student assessment instru-
ments.   For example, when a number of states began to
design new accountability systems in the early 1990s, many
policymakers hoped to include performance measures us-
ing newer types of assessment formats.  Performance tasks
and open response formats were thought to provide better
assessments of the knowledge and skills called for in new
standards.  However, questions about the reliability and
validity of some innovative assessment instruments such as
those used in Kentucky and Vermont led to hesitancy about
building new accountability systems, especially those with
significant rewards and sanctions, around them (Elmore,
Abelmann, and Fuhrman, 1996;  Koretz, Deibert, and
Stecher, 1994; Catterall, Mehrens, Ryan, Flores, and Rubin,
1998; Kentucky Institute for Education Research, 1995).
Some early adopters of new forms put multiple choice for-
mats back into their assessment systems, and by mid-de-
cade, most were concerned about “balance,” about mixing
some open-ended formats with more traditional item for-
mats (Massell, Kirst, and Hoppe, 1997).  Limiting open-
ended formats also reduces the cost and time requirements
of assessments.  This is important if states test each indi-
vidual student, as many parents prefer, and not just samples
of students.
States also have to decide whether to develop their own
assessments, designed specifically to address their stan-
dards, or to purchase commercial assessments, many of
which are advertised as being based on national curricular
standards.  These decisions have become more complex as
commercial publishers have included open-response for-
mats and performance tasks in their tests, seeking the bal-
ance that states have tried to achieve in their own custom-
designed assessments.
Another important issue in measuring student performance
is the determination of the standards of performance.
Policymakers must not only pick a measure, but they must
decide what is good or proficient performance on that mea-
sure.  It is important that these standards of performance
not seem arbitrary to the public.  When newer and less
familiar assessments are used, it may not be easy to explain
to the public why one level of performance is proficient and
another is not.  This is especially the case if more familiar
measures (e.g., SATs or ACTs) seem to provide divergent
information, as they did in some Kentucky schools, for ex-
ample.  Avoiding a perception of arbitrariness requires not
only clear explanations of the standards-setting process, but
also provision of examples of items and performance at each
level, so people can see for themselves how performance
levels differ and how they reflect different levels of knowl-
edge and skills.
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What is Satisfactory Progress?  Many new state account-
ability systems hold schools responsible for growth in student
performance. But how much growth is reasonable to expect
in each measurement period?  Is it reasonable to expect that
the same rate of growth can be sustained over a long period
of time? And should the same amount of growth be expected
for schools that start at different levels of performance?
Early versions of these new systems used growth projec-
tions developed through consultative processes, in the ab-
sence of actual evidence about how much growth would be
reasonable to expect in each measurement period.  In Ken-
tucky, for example, each school is expected to progress to
the point where the average student is performing at a profi-
ciency level on the state assessment in all core subjects at
the end of a 20-year period; every two years a school must
move a tenth of the way toward that. However, now that
these systems and their assessment mechanisms have been
in place for a few years, some policymakers are trying to set
growth curves for schools based on empirical evidence of
what is feasible. Policymakers should consult test publishers
as well as other states and districts that have used the mea-
sures they are considering in order to learn about the aver-
age growth paths and variation in performance of schools
starting at different levels.  Drawing on these experiences,
policymakers can determine what growth expectations to build
into their new accountability systems.
Holding Schools Accountable for Value-Added.   Many
policymakers believe that it is unfair to hold schools account-
able for factors beyond their control, such as variations in
preparation associated with the socio-economic background
of students.  So they focus accountability systems on satis-
factory progress, rather than on absolute performance—all
the more reason for setting progress goals carefully.  But
focusing on growth, often called the “value-added” by the
school, generates new controversies.  For one thing, many
accountability systems compute growth by looking at changes
between this year’s 4th grade scores and last year’s  4th grade
scores.  In other words, they measure achievement by look-
ing at the difference in performance of two different student
“cohorts.”   But teachers know that classes vary in unpre-
dictable ways.  A better measure of “value-added” would
track the performance of individual students’ scores over
time from grade to grade, but that can be very expensive,
requiring yearly testing of all students.  If the student popula-
tion is highly mobile, it is even more expensive. In addition,
some people say that accepting modest increments of growth
in schools starting out with a very low performance base
might never get their students to the level where they can
participate fairly in society.  Rewarding schools for making
such gains without motivating them to reach standards of
proficiency could be setting lowered expectations for their
students.  Many states try to incorporate both growth and
absolute measures in their systems for this reason.
Measuring learning gains that can be attributed to individual
schools is complicated immensely by student mobility.  If stu-
dent turnover is high, it is hard to hold schools accountable
for growth as the students being tested change frequently.
Schools showing low growth rates overall sometimes show
much higher rates of growth for students who have been
attending for two or three years.  Policymakers can use sta-
tistical adjustments to deal with this problem although it is
unlikely that they can address it to everyone’s satisfaction.
Perverse Incentives.   Most educators know that they can
bring school-level average scores up by working extra hard
with students in a few areas of the assessment, or by focus-
ing their efforts on those students poised to make the largest
gains.  To avoid such manipulations of the accountability sys-
tem, which ostensibly is intended to improve the overall per-
formance of all students, policymakers often try to build in
safeguards.  They monitor student exclusions to make sure
that low-performers are not kept out of the testing pool and
take security precautions so that no one can tailor test prepa-
ration to a few items.  In addition, they can require that the
scores of the most low-achieving students must improve as
well as the average scores of schools. Texas holds schools
accountable for showing significant growth in the scores of
sub-populations of students, so that educators will focus their
efforts on each ethnic group. Similar procedures can be used
to ensure that gender differences are not neglected.
Difficult Issues Facing
Policymakers and Educators
• How is Performance Measured?
• What is Satisfactory Progress?
• Holding Schools Accountable for Value-Added
• Perverse Incentives
• Complexity and Trade-Offs with Fairness
• What About the Middle of the Distribution?
• State Capacity for Remedy
• Stability and Credibility
• Process Regulations Don’t Go Away
• Public Understanding
• Student Incentives
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Complexity and Trade-Offs with Fairness.   In order to
use multiple measures, focus on value-added, adjust for mo-
bility and avoid perverse incentives, many states have devel-
oped very complex indices to judge school performance and
progress.  Such formulas may be necessary to fairly account
for all the factors influencing performance, but they are diffi-
cult to explain to the public.  Frequently policymakers them-
selves do not understand them, and when various constituen-
cies object to sanctions or complain about failure of a school
to get a reward, they are unable to defend the system.
Policymakers should hold themselves responsible for what-
ever accountability system they adopt and for making it com-
prehensible to the larger public.  They should balance com-
plexity in the name of fairness with clarity in the name of
legitimacy.
What About the Middle of the Distribution?  Most of these
emerging systems focus attention on the lowest-performing
schools, which are subject to sanctions, and the highest-per-
forming schools, which are eligible for rewards.  They do
little for those in the middle.  Schools plodding along at a pace
not sufficient to get a reward keep their noses out of trouble,
but they are unlikely to get technical assistance (or at least
none directly associated with the accountability system) that
might boost them into reward categories.  Schools that are
not improving, but not declining, are likely to avoid sanctions
in many systems; they are also likely to be ignored.  Evi-
dence of a lack of attention to the middle is the flip-flopping
of schools between sanctioned status and non-sanctioned sta-
tus.  In some states, schools in trouble get enough attention to
get them out of trouble, but then are left alone for a year or
two without further help, and often slip right back into a sanc-
tion-eligible category.
State Capacity for Remedy.   The reason schools in the
middle of the distribution are likely to be ignored, and schools
at the bottom frequently get insufficient help, is that states
have limited capacity. Not only are agencies hard-pressed
due to cuts in state funding, but they also often lack the kind
of instructional expertise necessary to make a difference in
troubled schools.  To generalize, states employ a series of
remedies for schools judged to be low-performing, ranging
from technical assistance to takeover to actually closing the
schools, by either redistributing students elsewhere or by re-
opening it with new staff.  But often the remedies are vague
and the technical assistance is meager.  One part-time per-
son might serve as an advisor, for example. The new federal
Comprehensive School Reform Design Program, which pro-
vides $50,000 annually for schools employing external de-
signs, might help low-performing Title I schools get assis-
tance they wouldn’t otherwise.  However, the most troubled
schools may be too distressed to pick or profit from a good
design.  They need an infusion of assistance nonetheless,
and few states adequately budget for it.  It appears that many
states fail to appreciate just how costly the remedy or sanc-
tion side of the accountability system can be.  They know
how to cost out rewards, but tend to underestimate the cost
of sanctions.
Stability and Credibility.  Political change is threatening to
accountability systems that depend on educators’ faith that
the consequences they are told to expect will really happen.
Leadership turnover and change of heart—and the tendency
to back away from severe sanctions at the end of the day,
which has happened in some places—undermine the cred-
ibility of these systems.  An illustrative anecdote is the fa-
mous “$300” problem in Kentucky.  In the 1980s, the legisla-
ture passed and then failed to fund a promised bonus for
teachers.  The new accountability system enacted in 1990
had to overcome this history and convince teachers that they
really would get the rewards built into the new system. Skep-
ticism was a major barrier to making the new system work.
Legislators might consider putting reward dollars in escrow
to reassure teachers that they really will be available in the
future.
Those Process Regulations Don’t Go Away.  Bearing down
on performance makes sense if the state simultaneously re-
laxes from process regulations that might restrict flexibility in
reaching the new performance goals.  Examples are man-
dates to teach students or teachers specific topics, like Lyme
Disease prevention, that might be worthwhile but that are not
related to the state’s performance goals.  Despite rhetoric
about more autonomy in return for greater accountability,
however, most states have not repealed much of the existing
process regulation.  Opposition from those attached to the
status quo, comfort with traditional arrangements, and iner-
tia, among other reasons, make it unlikely that policymakers
will revisit old policy when they pass new policy.  Some regu-
lations protect powerful political constituencies, like special
interest groups seeking a niche in the school curriculum.  And
many regulations are intended to ensure that minimal stan-
dards are met in districts of varying wealth, location, size,
and capacity.  These regulations form the cornerstone of tra-
ditional approaches to equity, and whether or not they are
effective, it is still difficult to argue for their removal in the
face of persistent differences in resources, teacher quality,
and program offerings.
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Public Understanding.   Not only are new accountability
systems likely to involve complex formulas, but also they of-
ten entail many other unfamiliar elements: standards-based
tests given to samples of students at key grades (as opposed
to the familiar pattern of norm-referenced tests being given
every year and yielding scores for each child relative to other
children); new roles for states intervening in schools; and
new publicity attached to performance.  It is important that
the public be educated about all of these aspects; without
public support, new systems will wither over time.  It is par-
ticularly important that people accept the need for students
to do well on the measures selected; it should be clear that
performance on state assessments affects important life out-
comes.  Otherwise, parents will not encourage students to
work hard in preparation, not understand why state money
should go to rewarding schools that do well on such tests,
and not support sanctions accorded to schools that don’t do
well.
Student Incentives.   Most of the new systems do not em-
bed consequences for students in their accountability ap-
proaches.  These systems are not designed to motivate stu-
dents.  Yet education is co-produced; teachers’ success is
dependent on students’ efforts to learn.  Many teachers ar-
gue that ignoring student consequences is unfair. They can
be penalized if the students don’t do well but there is nothing
to motivate students to take the tests seriously.  Gradually,
some states are attaching promotion and graduation conse-
quences to their new assessment measures, phasing in the
requirements so that schools have a lot of time to give stu-
dents adequate opportunity to learn the necessary material.
International evidence suggests that curriculum-based exami-
nations at the time of high school completion can spur higher
overall achievement.  Students from countries using medium-
and high-stakes assessment systems outperform students from
other countries, at a comparable level of economic develop-
ment, that lack such systems.  In addition, qualifications for
entry into secondary school teaching are also higher in na-
tions with curriculum-based external exit examinations. Evi-
dence from Canada shows this same pattern among that
nation’s provinces. Not only did 13-year-olds from Canadian
provinces with exit exams know more science and math-
ematics than students in other provinces, they watched less
TV and talked with their parents more about schoolwork.
Schools in provinces with external exams were more likely
to employ specialist teachers of mathematics and science;
hire math and science teachers who had studied the subject
in college; have high-quality science laboratories and experi-
ments; schedule more hours of math and science instruction;
and assign more homework in math, in science, and in other
subjects. Clearly, Canadian external exams have not low-
ered the quality of instruction, they appear to have enhanced
it (Bishop, 1998).
Even low-stakes curriculum-based exit exams such as the
New York State Regents exams appear to have an effect.
Holding student demographics constant, New York State stu-
dents do significantly better than students in other states on
the SAT test and the NAEP math assessments (Bishop, 1998).
New York is currently phasing in a requirement that all stu-
dents must pass the Regents exams to graduate, creating a
high-stakes accountability environment for students.
How Do New Systems Work?
New accountability systems focus attention on performance,
seeking to inspire school personnel to attend more to student
achievement.  What we don’t yet know is the quality and
duration of the instructional changes that occur in responding
schools. We don’t know whether such systems cause teach-
ers and administrators to attend to the kind of capacity-build-
ing that will enable them to improve instruction and learning
over time.
Getting Attention.  Evidence on effects comes from studies
of high-stakes systems.  Clotfelter and Ladd (1996) found
higher pass rates in reading and math in Dallas schools, where
a complex reward system is in place, than in other Texas
cities, even after adjusting for other reform efforts in those
cities.  In addition, the disaggregated, sophisticated informa-
tion collected to operate the incentive program in Dallas pro-
vided a useful managerial tool.
CPRE has conducted interviews and large-scale surveys of
teachers and principals in two research sites with new ac-
countability systems: North Carolina’s Charlotte-Mecklenburg
School District and Kentucky (Kelley, Milanowski, and
Heneman, 1998).  We found that setting student achieve-
ment goals for a school helps provide teachers with a focus
for their work and increases the energy devoted to instruc-
tion.  New systems help channel teachers’ work to the most
important goals of the system, largely those included in the
performance measure, which, in the cases we are studying,
is student achievement in the core academic subjects.
Teachers placed value on the consequences included in these
accountability systems,  and those consequences helped mo-
tivate them to work in more focused ways to produce im-
proved student achievement.  In the Kentucky and Char-
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lotte-Mecklenburg studies, we found that teachers positively
valued personal satisfaction from increasing student learn-
ing, professional recognition for doing a good job, and receiv-
ing a monetary bonus.  Bonuses seemed to be less of an
incentive for many teachers than a “thank you” for a job well
done, but teachers tended to agree that the bonus was an
important symbol of accountability or efficiency to the pub-
lic.   Negative outcomes, which were equally motivating, in-
cluded increased pressure and stress to improve results, fear
of being labeled as a “school in decline” and the accompany-
ing professional embarrassment, loss of freedom through some
state directed assistance or “takeover,” and expanded work
hours.
Additional findings about the bonus part of these programs
were that teachers who reported being most motivated by
the program and wished to see it continue were also those
who were most dissatisfied with their current level of pay,
those who felt it was fair to receive a bonus for improving
student achievement, and those who felt that administration
of the bonus process was fair.
Our conclusion is that, contrary to the views offered by some
commentators, money bonuses are valued by teachers and
can be motivating, and sanctions such as school reconstitu-
tion or identification as a school in decline are also valued
(though negatively) and can also function to motivate.  Both
get teachers’ attention.
Variable Responses.  It is also clear from our work, how-
ever, that teachers and schools vary in their responses to
these accountability systems. Several factors help account
for this variation.  If schools had previously received a re-
ward, the possibility of another positive outcome tended to be
a primary motivator.  If a school was in a non-improving
mode, the negative outcomes seemed more salient.
Much of the variation in response is related to individual and
organizational capacities. Teachers believe that their knowl-
edge and skill and school conditions are the critical elements
that help them accomplish accountability goals. Principal lead-
ership skills, the opportunity for feedback on results, curricu-
lum alignment, professional development, and the sense of
professional community at the school are more likely to be
assessed positively in schools that accomplished their goals
for improving student achievement than in schools that did
not.
In fact, without strong leadership, a cohesive professional
community, and access to good professional development, a
school’s response may be short-term and superficial. On the
whole, the schools operating under severe sanctions (recon-
stitution and probation) that CPRE is studying in San Fran-
cisco and Chicago do not appear to be making fundamental
changes in their core processes. These schools seem to be
placing considerable emphasis on test preparation.  Some
may incorporate some structural changes (such as breaking
up into small schools) but few appear to be making extensive
or deep efforts to rethink their instructional program (O’Day,
in press).
An important question for research is how these new state
and local accountability systems interact with variations in
school capacity.  If, as previous research predicts and cur-
rent studies confirm, factors such as teacher knowledge and
skill, principal leadership, professional community, etc. “en-
able” positive school responses to external accountability
systems, how do we work to foster these conditions?  In
other words, how can accountability systems lead to effec-
tive capacity-building?  Are certain approaches to account-
ability more likely than others to engender capacity-building?
Over the short-term? Over the long-term? How else can
policy provide for capacity-building in addition to establish-
ing accountability systems?
Relationship Between Internal and External Accountabil-
ity Systems.   One way to think about the relationship be-
tween school capacity and new accountability systems is to
ask about pre-existing conceptions of accountability within
schools.   What are the within-school or “internal” norms
about accountability and how do they interact with the “ex-
ternal” systems created by state or district policy? When
new external systems, such as the ones we have been de-
scribing, hit schools, can we expect variations in responses
based on how schools already think about their responsibility
for student learning?  In other words, “When accountability
knocks, will anyone answer?”  In 20 public, parochial, inde-
pendent and charter schools, CPRE found that internal ac-
countability systems varied widely and were not necessarily
related to the external accountability system (e.g., whether
the school was a charter school).  It is important to note that
none of these schools were in Kentucky or other settings
with strong new accountability systems (Abelmann and
Elmore with Even, Kenyon, and Marshall, 1999).3
In the typical school in our sample, individual teachers’ con-
ceptions of their responsibility exercised the greatest influ-
ence over how schools addressed the accountability prob-
lem.  For the majority of schools we studied, questions about
the collective purposes of the enterprise were answered by
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the aggregation of individual teachers’ decisions. The views
of individual teachers about their capacity and that of their
students determined what, if anything, was done to improve
performance, not collective deliberation or explicit manage-
ment decisions.  In such circumstances, the school’s “solu-
tion” to the accountability problem—to whom, for what, and
how?—became simply a collection of individual, often idio-
syncratic, judgments by teachers, growing out of their back-
grounds, capacities, and individual theories about what stu-
dents can do.  These judgments were powerfully influenced
by teachers’ preconceptions about the individual traits of their
students, as well as the characteristics of students’ families
and the communities from which they come, and typically
uninformed by systematic knowledge of what these students
might be capable of learning under different conditions of
teaching.
Hence, in these schools, teachers assigned the most power-
ful causality in their own conceptions of responsibility to fac-
tors over which they, as teachers, have little or no control,
and they assigned the least powerful causality to those con-
ceptions over which they have the greatest control, the con-
ditions of teaching and learning in the school.  Schools oper-
ating in this mode were characterized by an emphasis on
order and control (the one collective expectation on which it
was possible to get consensus in an essentially isolated work
environment) and by low expectations for student learning,
usually wrapped in theories about the relative deprivation of
students, their families, and their communities.
In these schools, teachers and principals often dealt with the
demands of formal external accountability structures (cur-
riculum guidance, testing, and the like) either by incorporat-
ing them in superficial ways—claiming, for example, that they
were consistent with existing practice when they clearly
weren’t—or by rejecting them as “unrealistic” for the type
of students they served.  As noted, none of the schools in the
20-school study were located in strong external accountabil-
ity environments.  Some were in districts or states in the
early stages of developing stronger external accountability
systems. The charter laws operating in these states were in
the early stages of implementation, and these states hadn’t
yet confronted the issue of charter renewal directly.  So the
observed weak effects of external accountability systems
may simply be attributable to the specific policy environments.
But, it seems highly unlikely that schools in which all ques-
tions of accountability are essentially questions of individual
teacher responsibility will be capable of responding to strong,
obtrusive external accountability systems in ways that lead
to systematic, deliberate improvement of instruction and stu-
dent learning.  The idea that a school will “improve” its in-
structional practice, and therefore the overall performance
of its students, implies a capacity for collective deliberation
and action that schools operating in the typical mode observed
in this CPRE study simply did not display.  Where virtually all
decisions about accountability are decisions taken by indi-
vidual teachers based on their individual conceptions of what
they and their students can do, it seems unlikely that these
decisions will mystically produce a strategy for overall im-
provement for the school.  So for schools operating in this
mode, the key question for future research on the effects of
external accountability systems is whether schools can, or
will, respond by developing congruent internal expectations
and accountability systems.  And, perhaps more important, a
related question is how these schools develop the capacity to
generate these new internal norms and processes.
Schools that have developed clear internal expectations and/
or accountability systems raise a different set of issues about
the relationship between internal and external accountability.
Our research suggests that such schools answer the ques-
tion of what they are accountable for in very different ways—
some focus on relatively low-level therapeutic purposes, some
on higher-level aspirations for student performance.  So for
these schools, the issue is the degree of alignment between
their internal expectations and accountability systems and the
demands of external systems, as well as the level of conflict
and accommodation that grows out of the confrontation be-
tween internal and external accountability.  Are schools that
manifest some capacity to deal collectively with the internal
accountability problem more likely to adapt and align their
internal norms and systems to the requirements of external
systems, or are they likely to be more resistant to changing
their norms and systems?  Do such schools have the neces-
sary capacities to do the work of accommodating and adapt-
ing new external requirements?  The existence of collective
internal expectations and accountability structures, in other
words, does not necessarily predict exactly how a school will
respond to new external requirements.  These are questions
to pursue in future research.
New Accountability Systems: Getting Attention vs. Get-
ting Capacity.   The research that we have just summarized
shows that new accountability systems can be motivating,
especially in the presence of certain enabling conditions, and
that internal, shared beliefs about the importance of student
performance are likely to be key enablers.
9
Previous research calls attention to both “will” (motivation)
and “skill” (capacity) as influences on improving schooling
(e.g., McLaughlin, 1987).  In our studies of the influence of
accountability systems, we have been working with a model
of motivation developed from Expectancy Theory (Vroom,
1964) and Goal-Setting Theory (Locke and Latham, 1990)
(see Figure 1). The model suggests that a teacher will be
motivated to try to reach the school’s student achievement
goals to the extent that she (a) perceives a high probability
that teacher effort will lead to students’ reaching achieve-
ment goals (expectancy perception); (b) perceives a high
probability that goal attainment will lead to certain conse-
quences or outcomes such as a bonus award (instrumentality
perception); and (c) places value, either positive or negative,
on these outcomes.
What we have learned is that new accountability systems
seem to work primarily on (b) and (c); i.e., they relate goals
(student achievement) to outcomes or consequences (both
positive and negative) that teachers generally value.  These
are important contributions.  As noted previously, teachers
have often been skeptical about promises that reaching goals
will have consequences; in the systems we have studied, this
skepticism was overcome.  Teachers believed that the bo-
nuses or the sanctions would actually take place.  And, they
find both the positive consequences, including bonuses, and
the negative consequences motivating.
With respect to (a), however, the expectancy that teacher
effort will actually lead to the desired level of student achieve-
ment, accountability systems appear to provide only a part
of the answer.  Goal-setting theory (Locke and Latham, 1990)
suggests that the nature of the goals themselves can affect
the effort-to-goal calculus.  The clearer and more under-
standable the goals, the more likely teachers will think that
their effort will lead to reaching them. So, to the extent that
new accountability systems include clear and specific goals,
teacher expectancy may be affected.   This finding certainly
argues that attending to several of the design issues men-
tioned previously—using meaningful measures, setting rea-
sonable expectations of progress, and establishing compre-
hensible and fair systems—are important.  Further, when new
systems include technical assistance, such as the help pro-
vided by Distinguished Educators assigned to schools in de-
cline or crisis in Kentucky, they are attending directly to fac-
tors influencing expectancy: teacher knowledge and skills,
curriculum alignment, and other enabling conditions. Reward
schools in Kentucky that rebounded from decline status spe-
cifically attributed their success to the assistance of a Distin-
guished Educator (Kelley, 1998).
Apart from the technical assistance provided to schools in
trouble (which, as noted previously, is frequently dropped when
the school improves), accountability systems as currently
designed do not directly work on the capacity issue—on the
teacher competencies and school conditions that affect the
effort-to-achievement calculus.  Their design is based on one
of two assumptions: either schools already possess the ca-
pacity, but not the will to meet goals, or, once the goals are
clear and valued consequences are attached, schools will shop
for or find the capacity they need to meet the goals.
However, we have already seen that the mere imposition of
a new accountability system—even ones like the Kentucky
and Charlotte-Mecklenburg systems where the goals are
thought to be clear and outcomes both sure and motivating—
does not unleash some hidden capacity.  Schools clearly vary
in their response to accountability systems, and that variation
is strongly associated with existing school and teacher ca-
pacities.  As to whether accountability systems cause schools
Figure 1
A Model of Teacher Motivation
     Competencies
Teacher Effort   Student achievement  Teacher
  goals or targets Consequences
  Intensity          Enablers    Positive
  Focus        Negative
  Persistence
to seek help and find or build the necessary capacity over
time, only research over a longer period can tell. We are
conducting such research, studying schools operating in es-
tablished accountability systems as well as in systems just
coming on line.  We will look at different types of account-
ability systems, including ones that attend to student incen-
tives.  Our work will examine both the demand side—whether
schools seek capacity-building help—and the supply side—
the adequacy and quality of capacity-building interventions
available in the public, private, and non-profit sectors.  If ac-
countability systems do not create sufficient demand over
time and/or if the existing supply of assistance is unsatisfac-
tory (or unavailable to schools that lack sufficient fiscal re-
sources), then states and districts will have to attend directly
to capacity-building themselves if they want to increase sys-
tem performance. They will not be able to rely on account-
ability systems alone to leverage significant improvement in
student achievement.
Also clear from our research is that capacity-building efforts
must attend to internal norms about accountability.  Certainly
teacher knowledge and skills are key, but so are teacher ex-
pectations about student learning.  Teacher beliefs about
whether their students will benefit from their effort exercise
a strong influence on the expectancy calculus. As we have
seen from our 20-school study of internal accountability, many
schools’ teachers have no collective sense of responsibility
for learning, and individual teachers are strongly influenced
by what they think their students can or cannot do.  They
have had no experience with students from disadvantaged
backgrounds learning challenging material; giving them such
experiences and showing them how their children can learn
to high standards are important aspects of capacity-building.
In addition, the shared norms and processes underlying col-
lective school improvement must be developed.
Conclusion
New accountability systems that are well-designed (with fair,
comprehensible, meaningful, and stable features) are associ-
ated with improved student achievement when adequate ca-
pacity to improve instruction is present in schools or can be
provided by an outside partner. Generally, teachers find the
new systems motivating.  But, in the absence of explicit at-
tention to capacity, the new systems are insufficient ap-
proaches to improving student achievement.  Our continuing
research will provide better information about the role of new
accountability systems in encouraging sustained capacity-
building and we look forward to reporting the findings in a
future policy brief.
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End Notes
1. This discussion includes excerpts from Susan Fuhrman,
“Evaluation of Performance in the United States: Changes in
Accountability” prepared for the Organization of Economic
Cooperation and Development, August 1994.
2.  New developments in testing technology, such as internet-
based computer-adapted testing, may alleviate some of the
technical problems in the future (The Consortium on Renew-
ing Education, November 1998. 20/20 Vision: A Strategy
for Doubling America’s Academic Achievement by the Year
2020. Nashville, TN: Peabody Center for Education Policy,
Vanderbilt University).
3. The remainder of this section draws heavily on language
in Abelmann, et al., 1999.
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Cyberspace Update
Have you had a chance to check out CPRE’s website  (http://
www.upenn.edu/gse/cpre) lately?  If not, we encourage you to do
so.  We have made some major changes including making more
publications available on the World Wide Web.  For example, all
CPRE Policy and Finance Briefs can now be downloaded.  De-
tailed research project information is now available.  We suggest
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features on the website.  Finally, we would love to get your feed-
back.  What can we do to improve the site and better meet your
needs? Let us know your thoughts by emailing our webmaster,
Robb Sewell, at robbs@gse.upenn.edu.
